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The Brazilianexperience of learning to livewith inflation is studiedby economists all over the worldas an example of successfuluse of "inflation- ary correction"lto minimize the distortionsassociated with inflation. Some of the results ofthis experience ofstabilization whilemaintaining growth, which beganin 1964, aremeaningful indeed. Inflationdeclined from an annualrate of approximatelyioo percent at the beginningof 1964 to one fluctuating between15 percent and 20percent in 1973. At thesame time, the rate ofgrowth in realoutput reniainedover 9.5 percent after 1968, and the volumeof foreign tradewent up substantially; thevalue of exports increased fromabout 1.5 billiondollars a year tosomething Over 7 billion at the endof the 1964-1973period. When the Brazilianprogram of stabilizatjo,1began, severalfactors caused distortions thatprevented theeconomy from performinghelter. Frt, withan acceleratinginflation thegover,inient adoptedas a general policy thepractice of fightinginflation by freezingthe prices ofsome goods and services
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reduced the rate of return on investiiient in these areasand (2) it increased
the need for government subsidies to the publicenterprises that produced
E
some of these goods and services,thus causing the government deficit to
rise.
Setting a 12 percent per year ceiling on interest rates(the so-called
"usury law") had highly negative consequences.It damaged the efficiency
of the financial market, which was thusrestricted to commercial banks and
ulo to a parallel market characterizedby a high degree of risk and inefficiency,
with the result that interest rates were toohigh for borrowers and too low
for lenders.
ulo Since the rate of exchange was kept constantfor long periods of time
and the internal inflation was very differentfrom the external one, there
were important variations inthe relative prices of export goods. As imports
were restricted by quantitativecontrols and extremely high tariffs, the rate
of exchange was kept overvalued. Thevariations in relative prices and the
overvaluation of the exchange rate limitedthe development of exports,
thereby shelving the external sector as a dynamicforce in the process of
economic development.3
Tax collections declined as a proportionof total output, partly because
taxes were fixed in nominal terms (not as aproportion of production) and
partly because the inflation stimulated adelay in payments, reducing still
further the capacity of the tax system to captureresources.4
The numerous distortions that onlyfar-reaching reforms could reduce
or eliminate, thegovernment's interest in reducing the inflation ratewith
the least possible social costs (in termsof reduced growth rate of real
output), and the lack of economic policy instrumentsmade it necessary to
adopt a gradualist strategy in fighting inflation.
by The three main goals of economic policy were:
1.to reduceri the shortest possible timethe existing distortions in the
economy so that the price systemcould once again operate as a more
ng efficient mechanism for allocating resources;
64
2.to promote a set of reforms to improvethe existing instruments of
economic policy and to create others whichcould serve to reach the
ne various goals;
ter 3.to gradually reduce the inflation ratewhile minimizing the social
costs normally involvedintile shock treatment, and, as soon as the
inflation rate was reasonably under control, to resume adevelopment
policy designed to maximize the growth rate' ofreal output.
ors
er. Unquestionably. the mechanism of inflationary correction,begun in
ral 1964, was an essential element for the successof the stabilization policy.
ne Its introduction into the Brazilian economy was notaccomplished at once;
c.) in fact, the mechanism is still in the processof being adopted, by trial and
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error. Nor can we speak 01 a universal systemol iridexation. Howeverwe
can point out the areas where it is most effective: (1)the financial market
where indexed bonds of short- and long-run maturity were ssjby the
National Treasury and the National Housing System, with inflationary
clauses also covering saving arid time deposits; (2) the wage policy, under
which the government annually fixes the rate of change of minimum wages
for different kinds of workers; (3) the foreign exchange market, wherea
system of minidevaluations has been followed; and (4) in the area of sorrc
administered prices (of public utilities, rents, etc.).
Inallthese cases different indexes and criteriaof iridexationwere
adopted. A wide range of financial markets which are riot indexed still
exists, such as hills of exchange. and in the price control system, which
includes some of the largest enterprises in the country, Price adiustnients
are made following a very informal procedure.
Although the inflationary correction was an important element in the
anti-inflationary policy, we feel that it would be a mistake to give it all the
credit for the success of Brazil's recent economic performance. Thatwas
due mostly to a better assignment of the available policy instrumentsto the
various objectives. A learning process was followed to achieve betteruse
of the different instruments; in some cases the creation ofnew ones was
necessary.
The debates concerning the advantages of indexatioriare far from
leading to a definitive conclusion. It has been frequentlyargued that the
system has serious shortcomings, and that with it we shall endup in a
worse position than with leaving inflation unchecked.
The first controversy has to do with the applicationof the inflationary
correction to factor markets. It is assumed that it wouldproduce a much
more stable aggregate supply of goods and services,nhinimizing costly
fluctuations of output and employment duringthe stabilization process. But
as the inflation rate becomes muchmore inflexible downward, the adjust-
ment period toward price stability becomes Ionger.6
There are at least three pointsto be discussed iii connection with the
preceding argument.First,ifinfact the indexation of factormarkets
stabilizes the aggregate supply,the cost of the stabilization policywou!d be
reduced. The secondpoint deals with the govemmeniscollection of the inflation tax.If indexatjon reduces therevenue from that tax, we would
have an additional factortoward the reduction ofstabilizationcosts. Finally, sinceexpectations can be adjusted fasterwith indexation than
without it, andexpectations about future inflationare an important element
in determining its actualrate, indexation introducesa destabilizing element into the growthrate of prices.
In any economy theadjustment during thestabilization period is carried out partly through pricesand partly throughreal income. Real incometluctuations derive ironi the tact that, due to information costs, it is difficult
to anticipate future price behavior. lprices rise faster than expected there
will be an overemploynient of factors, with a simultaneous rise in the
inflation rate and real product; this is usually known as a demand inflation.
On the other hand, since expectations about the price level are inilexible
in the short run, under a successful government stabilization policy actual
price increases will be below expectations. In this case we would have
underemployment of factors, together with inflation and a reduction in the
growth rate of output or even in its level.
The use of indexation would stabilize the level of aggregate supply by
reducing or eliniinating the divergence between actual and expected
prices. Output and Prices would behave as predicted by the classical
macroeconomic model. This argument has been used in favor of adopting
inflationary correction in the factors markets,8 but stabilization of the
aggregate supply is not the only justification for indexing. Let us also look
at the actual behavior of the inflation rate and the anti-inflationary policy of
the government.
First, as the returns in the area of information are higher the larger the
variance of prices, more resources tend to be utilized in information
gathering and less in true productive activities. Second, with the general
application of policies designed to suppress inflation, some prices, as well as
exchange rates, wages, tax rates, etc., are frequently readjusted, implying
changes in relative prices and a loss in the allocative efficiency of the
economy.
While indexing can reduce or eliminate all of these thstortions, it must
be pointed out that it involves difficult practical problems, as for instance,
what price index to use.
In order to utilize indexing, the government must decide to forego its
inflation-derived revenue, since generalized indexing reduces tax revenue.
That is so because the real money stock will fluctuate much less with
indexing than without it, and money stock is an important element in
determining the tax revenue from inflation. Moreover, with indexed bonds
the government transfers to the public part of that revenue. Finally, the
knowledge that such a tax exists and that there are ways to avoid paying it
puts pressure on the government to have interest paid on the compulsory
reserves of the banking system and to index tax rates in order to avoid
increases in the real progressivity of the tax system. This kind of pressure
will increase, since the share of tax revenue from inflation that accrues to
the banking system is declining. This is so not only because the tax rate is
diminishing (without compensation in the tax base) but also because now
banks have to pay interest on time deposits, so that the public receives the
part of the tax that was internalized by the banks in the pre-indexing
period.
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Council (set up by the Banking I aw of 1965)tried to increase the mohiltty
of these resources. Every time there was an excesssupply of funds in one
agency and excess demand inanother, the Monetary Council would sell
ORTN (maintaining the financial profitabilityof the fund) to the financial
institution with excess supply and would buy acorresponding amount from
the one with excess demand.
During the period under review, a largerfraction of assets held by the
public was in the portfolio of the private investmentbanks, commercial
banks, and finance companies.Itcan he shown that,when double-
counting is eliminated, the private sector isstill the most important channel
through which resources are accumulated inthe Brazilian economy.
Itis worthwhile noting that part of this increasein asset holdings is a
purely statistical phenomenon: before theinstitutional change a parallel
financial market was in operation, whoseholdings were not included in
the statistics. (It is impossible to get an accurateidea of the magnitude of
that market.) At any rate, the flow of savingschanneled through financial
instruments does represent a substantialfraction of total private savings in
the country.
Another critical issue under debate has todo with wage corrections. It
became important for two reasons.First,in the starting phase of the
Brazilianstabilization program (between 1964 and 1969)real wages
generally fell, indicating that the wage policy wasutilized as an instrument
for stabilization and growth. Second, whenthe data from the 1970 census
came in it became clearthat personal income distribution hadworsened in
the last decade, and the government's wagepolicy was considered one of
the main causes of this trend. One must becareful to clearl" distinguish
between these two phases: prior to 1968real wages did, in fact, fall, while
after 1968 the minimum wage policy wasused only to put a floor under
wage contracts. Thisallowed wage increases above officiallevels when-
ever there was excessdemand in labor markets.
However, no matter what the true causesof wage increases after 1 968
were, it cannot be deniedthat (1) the minimum wage does not represent a
correct indicator of the behaviorof wages in Brazil since the minimum
wage policy was not alwayseffective; (2) real wages generally rose inthe
period; and (3) the rise in real wagesoccurred at the time the economy
began to grow faster, indicating thatit was the market and not the
government's formula that commanded wage increasesin the country.11
Finally, it niust be admitted that the Brazilian exportpromotion system
was initially linked withthe introduction of the miriidevaluation scheme.In
fact, it was a prerequisite for it. But the effectsof tariff reduction and the
increaseinfiscalexportincentivesmust alsobe considered. The
minidevaluation system did reduce the variancein the relative prices of
exports, an important risk elementthat had been discouraging investment
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in the export goods sector. Lower tariffs increased thedeniand forirm higher fiscal incentives, the supply ot exports, thetwo togetherresulting ir more trade. The expansion in exports was characteri7edby a sizijj
diversification, and there was an improvement in theCOuntry's termsof trade because of a strong demand for our products ininternationalniarkets During most 01 this period, given the path of thecruzeiro devaluatio,.}s
internal nominal interest rates were higher than theexternal ones. Wefind that although there was a deficiton current account, due to the
overvalr,a_ tion of the cruzeiro (which contributed to raisingdomestic savings),there was a surplus in the balance of payments, with thenet inflow ofcapital attracted by the high domestic interest rates.Occasionally theaccumula tion of external reserves becamea problem in monetarypolicynan agement.
To sum up, one cannot credit theminidevaluation policy withall of the
expansion in international trade. Rather, itwas the result of a broad
general comiercial policy supported by theexchange policy.
Since there are manypapers available on the subject,u thisone will no deal with the hstory of indexingin Brazil, nor with theextent of itsactual application, Instead,itxviII discuss the topicsexplored above,many of which are interrelated,as outlined below.
In section two, we analyzethe revenue from theinflation tax andthe dynamics of inflation in theperiod prior to indexing. Amodel is introduc to show that expectationsare the prime factor in determining
inflation in the short run, but thatmoney supply is the mostimportant determinant over the long run. We concludethat without indexationwithout the utilization of the fiscalpolicy to collectresources for thegovernme0 leaving monetarypolicy for stabilizationpurposes, it would havebeen impossible to reduce theinflation rate in Brazil.Section three describesthe institutional reformsintroduced in orderto improve theallocation of resources, and shows that thestabilizationprocess began whenfiscal policy becameresponsible for the increasesin governmentrevenues and monetary policy, for thestabilization goals. Theinflation tax burdenis estimated, and theconclusion is reachedthat at the endof the period all of therevenue was transferredto the public. Wealso show howiidexation increases the degreesof freedom in themanagement of monetarypolicy. Section four dealswith the relationbetween indexat,onand the capital markets and Sectionfive discusses theeffects of theminidevaluation policy on the expansion ofBrazil's internationaltrade.
Ill INF[ATI AND THEINFlATION TAXBEFORE 1964
Before 1964,Brazil's inflationcan be esseritiall
attributed to the inept application of fiscaland monetarytools to attaintwo goals sin1ultaneotisl.:
ra,
)rtS, price stabilization and the mobilization of resources to finance governirierit
expenditures at a time when taxation could not be used effectively.'To
attain these two goals, the government should have utilized tax policy to
increase government revenues, leaving monetary policy free to take careof
price stabilization.'4 Due to the lack 01 tools capable of sterilizing the
monetary expansion caused by fiscal deficits and theunwillingness or
inability to increase taxation (which would have been quite unpopular), the
monetary and fiscal instruments could not be usedindependently. This
ere made it impossible to attain the two goals simultaneously.
tal During the whole of this period the government was deeply involved in
a- a development policy that gradually increased investmentsin inirastruc-
an- tore. At the same time, to diminish inflation it held constantthe prices of
public services, which generated extra deficits in the public conipanies
producing those services. These two reasons added to the fiscaldeficit,
raj and, unable to increase taxes, the government had to print money.The
finalresult was an increaseinthe rate of inflationto the noint of
ot hyperinflation in the period between 1963 and 1964.
ral In this section we show that there existed simultaneously a very strong
of tendency to increase the money supply as a way of collecting a substantial
amount of resources over and above the onesderived from the regular tax
he systemand to reduce the rate of increase in the money supply, which
ed would generate, at least in the short run, a significant loss of resources.
If the government has a monopoly in the creation of money, the entire
money supply will be purelyhigh-powered money, arid the government
he revenue from money creation, as a proportionof GNP, will be
(2.1)RM (M/Py)
he
of where a circumflex accent over a variable indicates its percentage rateof
al charge, M is the nominal stock of money, P. the general pricelevel, and Y,
d real output.
is By definition, t1is equal to the rate of inflation, ir, plus the rateof
change in the real stock of money (ni). This means that the tax revenue
n from inflation can be expresserl as
(2.2)R = (IT + in) (MIPy)
al
y If there is a private banking system, the government will share with the
commercial banks in the tax revenue from inflation. Using k for the money
multiplier, the government will receive a proportion (1/k) of the total
revenue. The private sector, including thebanking system, will get the
remainder of the inflationary revenue, lithe commercial banks can adjust
the rate of interest for loans to the level of the rate of inflation, keeping the
rates of interest on deposits equal to zero, they willinternalize (k-1)/k of
the total revenue.
rros Brazilian Indexation 15Empirical evidence for Brazilnrla series ot()tliei
countries shows that an increase in Al from a (:Or)Sta,lt levelAl) ()
c)ImOU)er > Alwill not show its (till impact on the rate of Inflation
at thevery moment that it occurs. iTidj1iStS tO the new equ Ibri urn level
With fairly long lags.'This shows that the inflation tax is a verytx'culi
A1 grows, the revenue increases in the short run fortwo reasons.because A;i increases, and because initially real cash balancesalso increasewith the growth of A;,. From (2.1) we obtain
dR d(A'l/Py)\4/P) (2.3) -M -f
dM dA;l
which is positive because in the short run bothterms on therightl1a side are positive.
In equilibrium the actual rate of inflation willhe equal totheexpected one(=iT1),if we assurine thatthe rnorey marketis alsoinfull equilibrium (of stocks and flows), and if,for reasonsof siniplicitwe neglect the changes in real income,we will have 0. Thfrom (22) we get:
(22)'R = 1T(MIPy)
Taking the derivative of this(unction for alternativrssalues ofwthat satisfy the equilibriumconditions in themoney marketwe get:
(24)dR=iT3(A't/Py)
+ (M/Py)0 diT alT1
depending on = j" / (M/Pv)jia(M/Py) / (lT11, where is the cost elasticity of the demandfor money.
we know from empiricalevidence, is proportionalto the rate of inflation, therefore thecost elasticity may begreater than, lower thanor equal to one. Dependingon the level of therate of inflationan increase in mn,infullequilibrjun] maygenerate an increasea constancy ora reduction in taxrevenue from inflation1
We also know thatin full equilihriun
reve,itje only declines tthsen high rates ofinflation and that formorereasonal)le" values of ,R3T will always hepositive. In anycase, there svil Ialways be an incentive toward inflation inthe shortrun, although for thelong run theincentise may be nonexistentThis mayexplain the fairlywidespread tende:ics'to use inflation asa way of mobilizing
resources'7 But it is alsoan argument to explain whythereis a strongresistance to stabilizing
.If current expenditures areinflexible downwardand the optionsto use other taxes are small, a sharpreduction in Mwill implyat least in the shortrun, a decision tocut 'nvestmentexpenditures
A C PictoreR. V. Almonacidaridi.R M. , rr'rican Under this set of conditions,stabilization can only hestarted if (1) there
other is an improvement inthe success of fiscalpolicy, both in increasing
very revenues and in cuttingexpenditures, and/or (2) the governmentissues
tairly bonds capable of sterilizingthe expansionary effects onM of the continu-
when ing fiscal deficit. Both measuresdepend crucially on indexation,particli-
cause larly in economies facing ratesof inflation as great asBrazil's.
h the At this point it is important toevaluate the dimensions of theinflation tax
inBrazil during the periodin which inflation wasaccelerating, and
examine the course of tax revenuesfrom inflation during theperiods of
adjustment immediatelyfollowing a sharp change inM.
The model used here isexplained in greater detail inanother paper by
side the authors.'8 Here we concentrateonly on the essence of theargument
with some simplifications thatwill nut change the natureof the results.
ected Let us assume first thatthe long-run demand lot moneyisa stable
full function of real incomeand the cost of holding money,that is
where it'is the logarithm of thedesired real stock of money,ir is the
expected rate of inflation,and zis the logarithm ofreal output.
The adjustment equationfor the real stock of money isgiven by
(2.6)d1i =' a(-t) + b(ft- Md) ±dp.d
where d indicates a derivativewith respect to time (i.e.,d = dKJ(), jt is the
logarithm of the actualnominal stock of money, andM" is the desired
nominal stock of money (InM' = This equation indicatesthat the
actual change in the realstock of money (theleft-hand side of the
equation) is equal to thedesired change (the right-handside), and that this
desired change is the sum ofthree effects." The first term onthe right-hand
side is the "stock disequilibriumeffect." It is assumed thatwhenever the
desired real stock is greaterthan the actual stock,individuals will attempt
to change the actualstock in such a proportionthat the final total willbe
100 percent of the stockthey desire to accumulate.
The second term on theright-hand side measures the"shock absorber"
effect. If individuals wish toincrease their nominalstock at a rate,", but
monetary authorities createmoney at a rateM greatei than
\1hi,for
example, individuals willinitially keep a proportionof that excess in their
real stock. This behaviorderives from the fact that moneyis above all a
transactions instrument that canbe exchaiiged for anyother asset cr good;
thus, until a decision ismade regarding the allocationof these additional
resources,itisfletterto maintain them inthe form of money.This
component of the adjustmentof the real stock of moneyis short-run by its
very nature and,therefore, the longer theperiod considered, the less
importance it will have.Thus, when the periodof analysis is short enough
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we expect b to be fairly close to I. In the kmg run I) oLight to be
zero, and for intermediate periods the value of b should varybetween oanj The last term on the right-hand side represents thegrowth effectlf!an were initially equal and grew at the same rate, ss'e would
have
continually.If Aid and Awere also equal, we wouldhave
continually. In such a case, individuals would accunhijlatemoneyaccord ing to the rate of change in the desired stock, thatS, dj.'d, The third equation is simply the definition ot therate of inflation,
given by the difference between the rate of nlonetaryexpansion and therate of change in the actual stock of money:
(2.7)ir = Al(i/i
We will finally assume that the expected rateof inflationfoi5 tt- adaptative expectation model proposed byCagan (I 956)
(2.8)dir" = c1(ir
The demand for money in nominalterms is given by
(2.5)'lnMd = - air' + f3z+ pC
where pe is the logarithm of theexpected level ofprices From (2.5) and (2.5)',20
(2.9)d - athre + [3dz
(2.10)M' = dLd + (Jp('= d' + ire'
tell us that the growthrate of the desired nominalstock ofmorley is given by the expected rate ofinflation (the rate atwhich the desiredreal stock depreciates) plus the growthrate of the desired realstock (thegrowth effect). Using relations(2.6),(2.7),(2.9), and (2.10),we arrive at the reduced form:
(2.11) (1b)M +b+ a(1_b)dire +a(_d)-- (1b)d1
which can beinterpreted as theaggregatt demandcurve on their- plane.
On theassumption that themoney marketisin stockequilibrium (m where rn and 01dare the actual anddesired stocks ofnione, respectively, i.e., mm and Inm'=) and that therate of inflation has beenconstant for a period oftime long enoughfor expectationsto adjusted, that is,ir = iTt, equation(2.11) reducesto
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This means that in the long run, when all the adjustments in the money
market are complete, the rate of inflation will be equal to the rate of
monetary expansion minus the product of the income elasticity of the
demand for money (long-run) times the rate of increase of real product.
However, in the short run, if (1 b) is small, changes in the growth rate of
the money supply will hardly affect the i)resent rate of inflation, which vill
be maintained approximately at the expected rate.
Assuming the income level to be exogenous and constant (dz = 0), the
model determines the path followed by IT and ,u when the rate of nionetary
expansion changes from one constant level to a higher one.2' This path is
typified in Figure 1.
During this entire period, the inflation tax base will he growing; assum-
ing that the "tax rate" also increases, there will be a continuous increase in
tax revenue.
As m grows relative to ni, individuals are induced to "get rid of the
excess supply of monetary assets," raising the aggregatedemand for goods
and services and (due to the assumed constancy of real output) the general
price level. After a certain period of time, the rate of inflation starts to





FIGURE 1Hypothetical Paths for 1and IT and for ni
and rn"20 A. C. Pastore, R. D. AlnionacIdfl(I1. R M Dt
Banns
a(kling new inflationary pressures. The flioment that Jl(Y\'ertake5/dCt real cash balances start to decline, reducing the increasesflaggrpgà1
demand for goods and services. The rate ofnfIatjri willnecessj,
overshootbecause the demand for morley ISnegatively Sloped
respect to the cost of holding money and the onlyWy torestore equilibrium (of stocks and flows) itt the money market isto reducem , order to make it equal to rni.2 In the long run, therefore,
m will
negatively related to1, but in the short run an increasein Al will
increase real liquidity in the economy.
While fis greater than it-. tM/Pt will be increasingand thesame wit occur with the tax revenue from inflation (between tand C1).When overtakes A1,tile base of the tax starts to diminishand therevenue to decl:ne. But if the cost elasticity of the demand formoney is smae
than one, at the end of the process (when full equilibririm is
reached)revenue will be higher than at the previous equ ili iJriunlpoint Not onlywill it be greater in the new equilibrium position, but the
gOvernnie11will also internalize any extra revenue due to inflation duringall of the
adjustment period.
Let us now concentrate on evakiatingempirically the orderof rnagnj of this revenue both in the full equilibriumcase and in the
transitI0 toward equilibrium. In this sectionwe deal only with total
revenue, leaving for later the question of whoappropriated theresources Collectedbetore and after indexation.
Let us first lake an approximation ofthe adjustmentequation for unite (liffereilces as
(2.13)P-t - = a(p;'/_) + b(Ai1-
In (2.13) we substitutedM" for', since the depreciationof the real stock is the doniinaritcomponent of the shock absorber
effect. The total growth effect given by(1 b) ('e) is also ignored in(2. 131 because its empiricalsignificance is very small.
Substituting in (2. 1 3) thedemand formoney (2.5), we get thereduced form
(2.14) ,- (i +b) +iz+ (1 -a) + bA!, +
whereis the random variableattache(j to tile nirxjelIn order to evaluate the sensitivity ofthe estimatesto any kind ofspeciticatioll bias sonic alternative specifIcat)I)Swere tried. Assuming thatthe shock absorber effectisnonexistent (b = 0), annthat theexpe( tC(Iia Ic of inflationis genera ted by
(2.8)'- c1f-I










(2.15)/i= d1ir1 ± d2+ (137 _I + (I4.Lt_i + (I5/,-2+ V
where
= - aac1. ('2 = af,(13 = - a/3(1 c1), (14 =(1 -a)+(1 -
and, finally,
= - (1a) (1c1)
We can now impose a setof restrictions on thevarious coefficients ofthe
will model and evaluate whichof the proposed specificationsbest predicts the
demand for money in Brazil.(See Table 1.)
ue to In the first equationof Table 1 we impose therestrictions, b=0; a ==
ian 1. In the secondequation we place no restrictionson a, estimatingthis
cnue coefficient in the model, butimpose b = 0 and c1 = 1.In the third one c,
it be is estimated in themodel, while we impose h =0 and a = 1. In thefourth
also equation we nipose only6 = 0, and the last equationhas no restrictions at
ment all.
In all these specificationsthe coefficients are highlysignificant but using
itude the R2 criterion, wefind the last one is the onethat best predicts p,. Also,
sition the coefficient of \1is highly significant, sothat there are no reasons to
aving reject the hypothesis thatthe 'shock absorbereffect" is present in the
fore model.
The point estimate of c1 in(2.1 5)=C is Cl = 0.305.In model (2.1 5)=D it
finite is not possible to obtainthe estimates of a and c1(because the roots involve
complex numbers, and we facethe familiar problem ofthe "symmetry" of
the roots in distributedlag models combiningpartial adjustment with
adaptative expectations),but, since the coefficientsof and p.,are
real very close to 1 .0and 0.25, respectively wedo not reject thehypothesis
total that a = c1 = 0.5. Thepoint estimate of c1 iiithe last equation was
cause obtained by the iterativemethod used by Cagan (1956).The R2 reached a
maximum when c1 = 0.4,but the likelihood ratiotest does not reject the
luced hypothesis that c1 lies between0.3 and 0.5. In thefollowing analysis we
use the estimate c= 0.4.
Another interesting test is to comparethe short- and long-runcost and
income elasticities in variousspecifications togetherwith the estimated
iluate values of a. Table 2 showsthese results, demonstratingthat, although the
some dynamic implications ofeach of those models is verydifferent, the coelfi
orher cients are quite similar,which gives us more confidencein the estimates of
is the tax revenue ironiinflation in a situationof full equilibrium.24
Table 3 shows estimatesof the inflation-derived revenuein a situation of
full equilibrium. Forquarterly rates of inflationof 5 percent per quarter,the
tax revenue from inflationwould be 4 percent ofGNP. At inflation ratesof














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eTABLE 2Values oi a and MoneyDemand Elasticities in
Each Model
Income Elactirity Value Cost ElasticitieSa
Equation(short run)(long run) of a (short run) (long run)
Cost elasticities were calculated withthe average rfatirn rate othe ;'riod--9 nervr'nl ier quarter.
period 1963-1964) the revenue goes upto 11 percent of GNP.Since the
money multiplier wastaking values around 1.5 and1.6 in this period the
government was internalizingbetween 60 and 65 percentof total reve-
nue.?s
It is interesting, however, tosimulate the dynamic path of revenuein the
case of aonce-and-for-all increase ini, and to compare it with the caseof
a once-and-for-allreduction in
In lable 4 we assume (strategyA) that the monetary authoritiesheld A1
constant at the level of 5 percent perquarter until the economyreached
the full equilibrium position,then increased it to 10 percent perquarter,
and subsequently kept it constantat this new level. At thebeginning of the
adjustment process the revenue was4 percent of GNP, and atthe end, 8
percent of GNP. But in the quarterin which the growth rateof the money
supply was increased, revenuejumped to 8.5 percent ol GNP,staying
above this level in the followingfour of five quarters and thensettling to
the new equilibrium position.
In Table 5, by contrast, we assume(strategy B) that thegovernment
decided to generate aonce-and-for-all reduction in M,initiallyat 20
percent per quarter, to 5 percent perquarter. In this case, theinflation
revenue, initially 13 percentof GNP, would be equal to 4percent of GNP
when the new equilibrium isreached. But in the quarter when 1is
reduced, revenue falls sharply to 3percent of GNP, stayingaround this
level for some quarters ahead.
The lack of other instruments tomobilize resources obviouslyreduces
the incentives to control the moneysupply. if we keep in mmdthat the
private banking systeminternalizes a part of the total revenue,it is possible
that a shock treatment will expose somebanks at least to bankruptcy.26 To
the extent that indexation generatesmore degrees offreedom to manipu-
late monetary policy, it improvesthe possibilities for stabilization, aview
that runs counter to the positionthat indexation tends toperpetuate
inflation. Brazil could only engagein a serious stabilization programonce
polcyniakers became consciousof this fact and started creating new
instruments capable of sterilizingthe growth rate of moneysupply and of
eliminating the inducementtoward inflation for mobi liz t ng resources.
(2.15)-B 0.229 0.718 1.6311 0.047 --0.147
0.148
(2.15)-C 0.251 0.718 1.646 --0.045
(2.1 5)-D 0.299 0.686 1.124 0.030 0.101































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8TABLE 4Government Revenue from Inflation, Strategy A
Final
equilibrium
TABLE SGovernment Revenue from Inflation, Strategy B
Initial










11111 BRAZIL'S MONETARY POLICY AFTERINDEXATION
The discussion that started in 1964 wascharacterized by the orientation
that inflation could only be controlledby reducing the rate of monetary
expansion. This, in turn, could beachieved only through (1) a gradual
reduction in the federal government's deficitsand (2) an effective control




















p. 7Ti. - r (actual)
0.20 0.20 0 128.5
0.20 0.20 0 128.5
0.05 0.15 -0.10 116.8
0.05 (1.10 -0.05 111.2
0.05 0.06 -0.01 10.1
0.05 0.03 0.02 112.3
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26 A
Convinced that it was primarily fiscal policy that hadto be' use(!
to gaiv resources for financing government expenditurestIn.'guVernrii,1
Started a new tax system and introduced the principles of infIationar,
COrrect0to eliminate some of the distortions from thetax l)ase
For the first time, the government abolishedtoe prohi bitiorion charging interest rates above 12 percent a year;tIlS() ISSuedgovernni0
bonds with interest rates corrected for inflationas one Way to
remove ti'e expansionary pressure from the Treasuryand tIle Bancodo Bracjj
Ihe Ii creation of the Central Bank introducedan iniportaritinstitljtjoflalreform which allowed a more effective controlover credit expansi0,1by the
Banco b do Brasil.
The National Monetary Councilwas set up and becametile
ilStitItiorI responsible for coordinatingec000rni(- policy. Prevkjs;,
this POlicyhad been diffused and uncontrolled,particularly in thenlorletary andfiscai area, creating incompatibilities betweengoals and policy
instrumentsand l!i reducing their efficiency.
Until 1965 the activities ofthe Central Bankwere exercised bythe Banco do Brasil, whichwas sinlultaneoiisly acornunercial bankand the financial agency of themonetary authorities.It is true that
Since 1945a government of Money and
Credit (SUMOC) had been in existencewhich was an embryoof the Central
Bank, designed to direct monetary policy.But it lacked policyinstruments and,besides, the largest part ofpolitical powerwas cIlways in the handsof the Bancodo Brasil, whichwas free to manipulateits policy of
applications Without considering the effectson the expansioui of themonetary base. Asa an commercial bank, the Bancodo Brashwas not subject toreserve require. ments, paid very lowinterest on rediscount,and had no limitimposed by SUMOC on itsapplications. Asa financial agency ofthegovernrnef jf received taxes and madepayments in the name ofthe Treasury. Allthis Th gave the Banco doBrasil consideraljjefreedom to expandcredit to the private sector.
F After the reformsof 1965 theBanco do Brasilcontinued as the financial an, agency of themonetary authorities butsince it was underno obligation to nb keepreserve requiren0çthe MonetaryCouncil starter!Putting ceilings to on its applicationsto he approved
pericrc!irally accordingto the 1)lann bnh monetary budget,
The MonetaryCouncil wasPresided over by theeconomic minister and -i included theministers of planning,agricultureand industry andcorn- thor merce, the president










decided by this council. With the Council, thus, the center of all economic
decisions,itbecdtIte 1iussibito rn,ke the management of the various
economic instruments compatible so that the projected economic goals
could be attained. Any interpretation of Brazilian economic policy after
1964 that does not pay due attention to the role of the Monetary CoUncil in
its direction loses all meaning.
Brazil's monetary base can be defined as the suni of the currency in the
hands of the public, M, the deposits of the public in the Banco do Brasil,
DUB, and total (voluntary and required) reserves of alt other commercial
banks, R.2'
tutjo0 (3.1)B = R + D'
had We are going to assume the following three behavioaI relationships:
tiscal 1. The public wishes to hold a proportion h of the total money supply in
s and the form of cash.
2. The ratio between reserves (voluntary and required) and total deposits
v the in the commercial banking system (D') is constant and equal to r.
the 3. The average propensity to deposit in the Banco do Brasil is constant
45 a and equal to g That is:
'4,, =hM: R= rt),and D' = g 0.where ()= 0H1 +
gned
ides, The money supply is defined as
o do (3.2) M = M,,
thout
As a and the money multiplier is given by
u ire-(3) k d by 1 - (1 - h)(1 - r)(1g)
nt,it
Ithis Then itis clear that
the (3.4)'4 = k B
Figure 2 shows that the money multiplier varied in the periodunder
ncial analysis between approximately 1.5 and 2.0 and tli't the main source of
n to monetary expansion was the behavior of the monetary base. Thisallows us
hings to abandon any attempt to analyze the variables that determinethe
med behavior of the money multiplier and to concentrate, instead, on the
behavior of the base.
and Table 6 shows the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary ai-
om- thorities from the standpoint of sources and applications. We define net
ts of loans to the government as the integral of the national Treasury's past
ank, deficit. Net credit to the private sector is the suni of direct loans of the
Banco do Brasil to the private sector and the value of purchasesof
price agricultural products under the policy of price supports, minus the deposits
y be made for foreign exchange transactions.
Brazilian Indexation 27--
I I I ! I I I
1960 1965 1970
FIGURE 2Behavior of Money Multiplier and theSources
of Monetary Expansion
Net foreign reserves are the result ofpurchases and sales of foreign
exchange converted intocruzeiros at the exchange rate prevailingat the
time of the transaction. Finally, bondsinclude all silos to the publico
Readjustable Treasury Bonds(Obrigacdes Reajustveis doTesourol and
Treasury Bills (Letras do TesouroNacional[ therefore it excludes thebondl held b commercial banksas part of reserve requirements. These holdings
have the effect ofIncreasing the protitability of banks andare neutral frorn the point of view of themoney supply.
\'iewed from theapplication side, themonetarbase is
(3.3! BC9_T-tL+Ro+,A±f























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5The contribution of each 01 these dements to the expansion of the
monetary base is computed by
(3 6)





+(RL)1 RD1 + fr,
Bti1 RD1 I 1 LA1! BIx1
We can see that during this period the main sources of the expansion in
B were LBB and CStarting with 1965, the sales of readjustable bonds to
the private sector appeared as an important element in the sterilization of
expansions in the monetary base. These sales compensated for the expan-
sion in B caused by the entry of foreign reserves in 1965, and againIroni
1969 on. The government deficit declined continuously during thisperiod
tip to 1973, when the federal government actuallyhad a surplus. In 1966
the rate of expansion in the monetary base diminished because of (1) the
loss of 'oreign reserves resulting from the constant upward valuation of the
cruzeiro due to internal inflation without adjustment of the exchange rate
and (2) the continuous reduction in the government deficit. In fact, 1966 is
the year when Brazil experienced the sharpest monetary contraction of the
first part of its stal)ilization program.
It is important to analyze the behavior of the government deficit during
this period. (The relevant information is in Table 8.) Tax receipts, 9.4
percent of national income in 1964, increased gradually toreach 14.3












_As a Proportion of
National Income
Rf' G/y Di
1964 2,129 2857 - 728 9.4 12.4 3.2
1965 3,907 4,499 - 593 10.6 12.2 1.6
1966 5,910 6,496 - 587 11.0 12.1 1.1
1967 6,814 8,039 -1,225 9.5 1 1.2 1.7
1968 10,275 11502 -1.227 105 11.5 1.2
1969 15,953 14,709 756 10.5 11.1 0.6
1970 19,194 19,432 - 738 11.0 11.3 0.4
1971 26,980 27,653 -672 11.6 11.9 0.3
1972 37,378 38,254 516 12.4 12.6 0.2
1973 52,863 52,568 + 295 14.3 14.3 -0.1
Brazilian Iridexation 31SOiJRcE.Natjo11Account5 Vaga,.Foundato)
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percent of national tn( ome in1 973. The rt'dt fl tl(.( ti
receip1ç ir 1 967 stemmed from the heavy monetary (ontr,lctiori011966 Wf)ich generated the recession starting in the first quarter ofI 967 ToeIimin,
the government reduced the tiscal burden impoci'd Oil firms by
1105lponn the deadline for the payment of taxes.This policy hadthe effect
increasing the aggregate supply (because of the reduction in
costs) of,
aggregate demand (because of the increase in disposable
income) for goods and services. Starting with 1969 we (n see the
results o improvement in tax collectionthe share of taxrece11)ts in the
national product increased substantially. Although government
expenditures also increased, the deficit diminished continuously, and in1973 thereWaS surplus. in part, this surplus was utilized asan additional instfljment
to sterilize the expansionist impact of capital inflowson the monetary
base, since the sales of government bonds to the l)lIhliChad I)rovedto he insufficient for this purpose. (This probleni isaria lyzeci in greaterdetail in the section on minidevaluations.)
Table 9 shows government receipts,current expenditures aridsavr8
not only of the federal government but also of thestates andniuflicipalities We can see that the savings of tile publicsector, whichrepresented 22 percent of total receipts in 1965, increased duringthis period toreach almost 30 percent of total receiptsin 1973.
The monetary basecan be analyzed both from theassets and the liabilities side. When thereis an increase in thego'ernn1ent deficit, in net
foreign reserves, and in theloans to the privatesector by the Banco do
Brasil, the applications of themonetary authorities increaseand the rnone. tary base (B = D'+ R + M,,) also increases.
The government'srevenue from inflation is obtained fromthe holders of R, D, and M, and thegovernment share of thisrevenue is given by








When the governmentincreases the supplyof bonds, it reducesthe
expansion rate of the base,thus reducing inflationarypressures. Asecond
problem is to find out whobenefited from the inflation taxcollected from
the holders of the monetarybase before and afterthe introductionof
indexation. We can estimatethis with the aid ofthe following expression:
A 1) 1
LR Lb RI)
(3.5)--=4T+(i-11.')---- +(i -iR)-----' R)
where 0e is the governmentdeficit (the increase inloans to the govern-
ment) and i(T/P)isthe flow of realincome paid to theholders of
government bonds. Let ussuppose that= r + yr" is"the" equilibrium
interest rate, given bythe realinterest rate plusthe expected rateof
inflation. Then the governmenttransfers subsidies to theborrowers from
the Banco do Brasil,given by (I- i/)(LIP),since the interest rate
charged by the Banco doBrasil was greatlysubsidized before indexation.
Loans obtainedabroad (converted intocruzeiros at the momentwhen the
foreign exchange wassold to the monetaryauthorities) includesubsidies
given by(I - j[x)(LrIP).Finally, the banking systemthat obtained re-
discount loans at asubsidized interest ratereceived (i - IR)(RDIP),where
i8is the rediscount rate.
At the beginning c1the period the stockof government bondssold to the
public was very small, soonly a very small amountof the inflation tax was
returned to the publicthrough this mechanism.The share of thefiscal
deficit in the increaseof the monetaryauthorities' total assets wasvery
high, which showsthat the central governmentwas internalizing avery
high proportion of thetotal inflation tax. Onthe other hand, the Bancodo
Brasil was heavilysubsidizing interest rates onloans, and the same was
happening with rediscountrates. Finally, thefixed exchange rate system
introduced a new sourceof subsidies. The loansgenerated by the inflowof
foreign reserves wereregulated by Instruction289 of SUMOC.Through
this "resolution" themonetary authorities wereguaranteeing the salesof
foreign exchange atthe rnonient of thepayment of the loan,hut if between
the contract of theloan and its repaymentthere happened tobe an
exchange rate devaluation,the exchange losses werepaid by the monetary
authorities. Under thesecircumstancesx wassimply the nominal interest
rate in theinternational market.
The introduction ofinflationary correctionbrought an increase inbond
sales to the public andin the amount thatthe central bank had to payto
the public (and tothe commercial banks, as weshow in the next section).
There is a reduction inthe difference betweeni and i/because, despite
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loans, the rate of interest becomes positive in real ternis. Finally,togeth(I
with the minidevaluations system, there is a change in thereg(Jlatin of
foreign loans, now governed by Instruction 63 of the CentralBank and b',
Law 4131. In both cases the central bank guarantees theavailabiIit,,
foreign exchange to repay the loan, but the exchange riskis now borneby
the private sector.
The nominal interest rate on foreign loans (deriving fromthe EurotfoIIr
rate plus the expected devaluation rate of the cruzeiro)was lower than the
(lomestic interest rate (deriving from the realrate plus the expectedrate of
inflation). There were at least threereasons for this difference. First,the
Brazilian growth rate (around 10 percent)was higher than in the rest ofthe world (areason, according to general equlibriurn theory,for Brazil's
interest rate to be higher than in other countries).Second, the excharge
rate'as devalued more or less by discounting from theinternal inflation
rate that of the rest of the world, generatingan expected devaluationrate lower than the expected inflationrate (once everybody beJie'edthat inflation in the rest of the worldwas not going to be zero).3° Finally,
since the governmentwas using open market operations tosterilize theexpan- sionary effect on M of the inflowof foreign reserves, thesales of bonds reduced their pnce, thusincreasing relatively the doniesticrate of interest (remember that interestrates on most loans are tied to theinterest rateson ORTNs).n
In other words, thegovernment always returned to thepublic a part of the inflation taxrevenue. Before indexation, however,the beneficiariesof these receiptswere the privileged debtors ofthe Banco do Brasil(with
TABLE 10Distribution of the InflationIa,c Burden
Subsidies to Monetary
Borrowers
Base Bond 1(1 -
Average Yield ± Deficit Period Change (iTT) -f(i - iR)RDI (0)
1961-1964 650.3 6.61 245.01 343,5a
)0.0Q) (0.377) (0.605)
1969-1972 4.412.2k' 2,281 .8 1,057 0' 670.5a
(0.518) (0.24(1) (0.152) Data from Table6.


























loans from both domesticand foreign resources).After the introductionof
indexation, a certainmargin of subsidiesremained, hut indexedbonds
became the main sourceof the tax rebate.
To ascertain tile sizeof the "burden" of thistax, we calculatethe
inflation tax "rebates' as aproportion of the flowof high-powered money.
We take only twoperiods: the first, between1960 and 1964,and the
second, btween 1969and 1972. For results, seeTable 10.
To sum up, in order toreduce the deficit and keepmonetary expansion
under control, the governmenthas to pay a nominalinterest rate (a positive
real rate on bonds) and returnto the public asubstantial proportionof the
inflation tax. Fiscalpolicy is used moreeffectively as a way tomobilize
resources. Itall points to a reductionin the pressure toinflate, and to a
better utilization offiscal and nionetaryinstruments for bothmobilizing
savings and stabilizingprices.
IVi THE ROLE OFFINANCIAL ASSETS INCHANNELING SAVINGS
There are at least fourquestions demanding aspecial analysis in this
section:(1) How has the newsystem of"forced savings" based on
inflationary correctionoperated? (2) How did theNational Monetary
Council utilize the indexedbonds to transfer funds(roni financial institu-
tions carrying asurplus to those carryingdeficits? (3) How wereindexed
bonds used to increasethe profit rate of theprivate banking systemwhen
bank revenues declined as aconsequence of thereduction in the inflation
tax? (4) Finally, what wasthe growth rate of thestock of indexed assetsand
how much of the totalof private savings wasmobilized through those
assets?
As to our first topic,three systems offorced savings werecreated under
the new system. Thefirst one, set up in 1965, wasthe National Housing
Bank, which receivedall the revenuesderived froni the socialsecurity
system, or FGTS(Fundo de Garantia por tempode servicos). Workersand
enterprises had to pay 8percent of the wagebill to create an insurance
fund against unemployment,corrected for inflationand paying a positive
rate of interest. Thetotal amount of thefund was transferred tothe National
Housing Bank, whichfinanced housing construction.
The second one wasthe so-called SocialIntegration ProgramPIS.
Again a new fund wascreated, which got itsresources from a tax
proportional to enterprise salesand divided into quotasdistributed to the
workers. This fund is alsocorrected for inflationand pays a positive rateof
interest. The funds werefirst given to theFederal Savings Bank(Caixa
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with the commitmentto I nanc' purchaseS of rnachiner' andequipment a medium- and long-term basis.
Finally, the third forced savingssysteni, the Prograrna (ICAssisténciaai>. Servidores piblicos, PASEP,is the complement of the formerfund, extend. ing the systemto public workers. This fund, like thePIS,s managec: directly by the Banco do Brasil,and is used, like the PIS, for
medium- and long-term financing ofmachinery and equipment purchases.
All lending with thesefunds involves charges forinflationarycorrect)n in addition toa positive rate of interest in order toassure the'private' profitability of the fund.It has achieved very importantresults infinancing the construction ofpopular housing, anda substantial part hasbeen applied to the financingof private investments,either directly inthe torni of loans from CEF and BNDEto the firms, or throughreallocation ofthe resources to private investmentbanks.
Table 1shows the value of thestock of assets mobilizedby these three funds, which hadreached, by 1973,18 percent of the totalof indexed assets.
Next on our agendaare the activities of the National
Monetary Council. Since the demand forinvestment goods that couldhe financedthrough the funds describedabove was not largeenough at theprevailing priceto utilize all thesavings accumulated,the NationalMonetary Councilstarted to sell indexed bondsto those agenciescarrying a surplus,while givingthe funds to otherfinancial intermediariesthat had deficits. In fact, wesee in Tables 12 and13 that a substantialpart of total ORTNs and LTNs soldby the Treasurywas bought by BNHand CEF(approxi- mately 33percent of the totalin 1973),indicating that thoseresources were channeled intothe monetarybudget andredistributed to theprivate sector through variouscredit lines forinvestment in agriculture,
industry, et cetera.
The CentralBank openeda 'window" operatingas a developmentbank (to finance projectsevaluated by theministries of agriculture,
industry and commerce, etc.), utilizingresources stemmingpartly fromforeign loans (IBRD, IBD,etc.) and partlyfrom surplusesof BNH andCEF. Special programs were createdin agriculture,land redistribution,export promo- tion, etcetera,involving relativelylarge magnitudes,as can he seen from the data inTable 14.
Despite the factthat BNH andCEF had thepresumed monopolyon using thoseresources, the National
Monetary Councilmade their applica- tion moreflexible,permitting theirreallocation toareas demanding addi- tionalresources to finance
investmentprojects. On the otherhand, as inilationwas diminishing,
interest had to be paid on compulsory





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4TABI-E 13LTN: Main Holders
(millions of cruzeiros) ----------.-----









National and state savingsbanks -- 446 949
Federal developmentbanks 140 183 24
Public




Insurance -- 8 8 12
Others
496 1,239 4,794 6,128
Total
700 3,880 10,204 17,400
increase of time(indexed) deposits overtotal deposits and,second, the
decline in nominal interestrates for loans(in the face of arise in real
interest rates) due tothe slower rate ofinflation.
Since the required reserveswere high(apprOXimatel' 30 percentof total
deposits) and could nothe reduced immediatelyfor fear of increasingthe
money supplyfurther, the governnlentdecided to pay interestrates on a
certain part of totalcompulsory reserves (thisproportion increased con-
tinuouSlY from 1965 to1969, when itreached a level of 60percent). The
sales of indexedbonds to the privatebanking systemhad no impact
whatever on the moneysupply; its sole effect wasto increasethe profit
rates of commercialbanks. Actually, this wassimply an additional wayfor
the government toreturn to society apart of the revenuesaccruing from
the inflation tax.
In Tables 12 and13 we estimatethe amount ofORTN5 and LTNsheld
by the public,deducting from thetotal the funds ofgovernment agencies
and commercialbanks held as analternative for conipulsOrYreserves.
Adding the stock ofhousing bonds, timeand savings depositswith inflation-
ary correction,and bills of exchange, wearrive at an estimateof the total
of financial assetsheld by the public.
The growth of theseassets does notreoresent theeftective increase in
savings, at least notuntil 1969. We havealready called attentionto the
existence of aparallel financialmarket before 1968whose sizeitis
impossible to estimate.This market wasgradually reduced and,by 1969.
was almostnonexistent. Itis obviouS thatthe transactionsthat had taken


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ma (Iii )he ftsr)lIil ,.(.rC.
i'Uer orrnagnit Under these (r( cjIstari( rthe d,jt,j,, -rmt us to
estimate t flow of ',aVil)5 mobilized tough ther' .
Hhlej f)fl'WtitS th' 1IUhh
' )Ohtlfl froymI al)liIf)IUS (,tIiriaIi-d in' ra":florporionaPital WeC3lCij Ite the ratio of total ',aving'estimated b. thapproach toCNP, and (ompar( this ratio to (he share ot gross pci,it(: nfl G\P. \\e
Can see that these two proportiOfl5fromts o indenendentou'ces. arenot'e different. 1 able I S shows also that thentroour_ ton nr atonar,
correc- tion permitted the creatiOn 01 atinafl malstem capabe ofmobilizingan important proportion ot totalprivate santbu her
economic (level- oprneflt.
RECENT EVOLUTIONOF THE FOREIGNSECTOR ANDTHE MINIDE VALUATION
The great expansion inthe external sector hasbeen one of thefactorsmost stressed in Brazil'srecent economicgrov th. -\ugust1 968. thedate on which the minidevaluationsstem was adonted.is considered theturning point in theprocess of opening theeconorns to international
trade after
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,nitucje decades of following an import substitution strategy. Existing analysis of
ate the this problem tends to emphasize two points: (1) that, despite an effective
opening of the economy, international trade does not seem to have played
ltairied
an important role as a source of growth compared to such other variables
calcu-
of the system as public investment; and (2) that the great success of the
P, and expansion in the foreign sector is due to the minidevaluation policy.
an see We believe that the explanation of the recent developments must take
ot very into account a greater number of variables than these. On the one hand,
correc-
the expansion of foreign trade must have had a much larger impact than
ing an usually admitted. On the other, a more flexible commercial policy was
devel-
adopted, which started reducing the average level of tariffs and introduced
a system of export incentives. The minidevaluation policy greatly reduced
the risk associated with export activities under the abrupt exchange rate
fluctuations caused in the past by infrequent devaluations within a frame-
work of massive inflation.
It is extremely important to point out that the minidevaluation system did
THE
not result in a fall of the real exchange rate over tinie. On the contrary, as
vill be shown later, the exchange rate appreciated during this period. This
apparent paradoxan appreciation of the exchange rate side by side with
s most a great expansion of exportsis reconciled when one notesthat the
ate on country's terms of trade improved sharply. The gain in the relative price of
urning exports was due to the joint effects of the export promotion system and the
e after strong demand for our products in the world markets. These more than
offset the effect of the exchange rate appreciation.32 Finally, considering
that the cruzeiro followed, along broad lines, the fluctuation of the dollar
vis-à-vis the currencies of continental Europe,it was much easier to
expand trade with the EEC.
On the other hand, given the behavior of the exchange rate, the interest
rates on foreign loans of short and medium maturity (particularlythose
from the Eurodollar market) were lower than the domestic rates. This had
(4) several implications. First, the inflow o capital financed an increasing
trade gap, with a positive impact on the economy's saving rate. Second,
this had the effect of reinforcing a policy of reducing internal interest rates.
finally,it was possible to accumulate a higher levelof reserves, an
important fact given the increasing volume of Brazil's international transac-
tions.
.14 The system is open to some criticisms. There were some allocative costs
inherent in the export promotion system actually chosen; the apparatus of
.12 import control, inherited from the period of import substitution, was still in
.14 operation; and the sharp increase in net foreign capital inflow required a
much more careful external debt policy.
')7O are Nevertheless, the new system appears to be clearly superior to the one in
force up to 1968, when the possibilities of new import-substituting projects
(Barros
Brazilian Indexation 4344 A C Pa5torv, R.U).Aln)Ofl,I( idilr)(l
JR
were drying up.Although the old systen) IS Well known,it is
summarize its results.
Prior to 1968, the exchange rate was fixed iflrionlinal terms
high level of tariffs, due to the import substitution strategy,
thee>.ch,0 rate was overvalued. Overvaluation and high tariffs resulted
in a low
leve of import demand and penalized exports, resulting ina relJtivl,
of foreign trade. The main consequence W15 a Slowdov0
iP thegro. process once the easier investment opportunities in the
importsubStt. sectors were realized.
Fixed nominal exchange rates under Coditionsof domesticin1j0 resulted in a high variance in the real exchangerate (deflatedb) internal price index). Even if the average realexchange ratecould h made some export activities profitable, the varianceof Prices
introduced high degree of risk that prevented the productionfor exportof various potentially exportable products.
The expectation of devaluation resultedin an irregularbehajo1o foreign loans, with alternating inflows andoutflows of hotmoney
soon as a devaluation occurred there was a generalexpectationthat thee. change rate would remain frozen fora relatively long periodof time,since it was known that the exchangerate was changed
infrequently Conse- quently. whoever borrowed dollars andexchanged them forcruzeiros onk had to pay the external interestrate, provided the exchange
rate Was n changed. The external interestrate was, under the
inflationary Conditions lower than the domesticrate. When the balance ofpayments gap widenej due to the rise in theinternal price level, theexpectation arose that the actual exchange rate couldno longer be maintainedThe resultwas thai loans were liquidatedwhenever a devaluationwas expected, with the consequent loss of reserves and reductionin money supply.Just after devaluation, on the otherhand, therewas an inflow of hotmoney expanding the monetarybase and increasingthe money supply.
The reduction of theseundesirable effectswas one of the main achieve. ments of the minidevaluationpolicy. Thus,minidevaluations were inipor- tant in themovement toward Opening theeconomy as well as snioothing the operation ofmonetary policy.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURC[:International Financial Statsstiçc arid APEC1974
Mill,ons ci cruzejrris
1'Exports andrnper-ts evaluated at 1968 exchange ate
the end. Using theexpression
(X
GNPas an indicator of the sizeof for-
eign trade, onecan see that this ratio went from6 percent to 8percent of GNP. Furthermore sincethe value ofexports is calculated bymultiplying the external price bythe exchange rate, thesize of trade is reducedwhen the exchange rateappreciates, everything elseremaining constant.t3 To allow for this effectwe reconstructed (in column5) the relative volumeof trade, using theexchange rate of 1968;its share of GNPdoubled durittg the period underreview, showing thatinternational tradewas a much more important source ofgrowth thansome people indicate. We cannot forget,either, that thisbehavior occurredat a time when domestic outputwas growing at a lastrate; that better terms oftrade means a higher real income forthe country;'4 andthat the tradegap increased the overall savingsrate.
After a generalreview of the foreignsector we shallcomment in more detail on thevariables responsiblefor thissuccess Given the present Interest in theaspects of the foreignsector connected withindexation, it is valid to begin theanalysis with theeffects of theminjdevalitatjon policy. It wasPreviously pointedout that the changein the mechanism of exchanige ratedevaluation didnot result ina relative fall in the value of the cruzetro and that theprincipal advantageof the minidevalijationswas to
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1960 88 2734 3.22 6.36 .
1961 166 4,029 4.12 6.75
1962 206 5,339 3.86 7.67 5 3 1963 363 11,857 7.06 5.61 51) 1964 773 22,904 3.37 8.()
6.3 1965 1,614 36,424 4.43 5.69 46 1966 2,133 53,216 4.01 (.65 6.4 1967 2,474 70,699 3.50 6.05 6.2 1968 3,629 98,957 3.67 6.57 ) 6 1969 5.989 I 31,883 4.54 6.91) 69 1970 8,234 204,723 4.02 5.30 6.2 1971 11,272 271,809 4.15 6.36 71 1972 17,746 355,822 4.99 7.26
1973 30,179 473,181 6.38 8.02 10.4\Ports +reduce the risk associated with export activities. Figure3 emphatically
Imports)billustrates that with the new policy the real exchange ratelit)lungui
GNP fluctuates as much as before.
(5) As a measure of the flutuations in the realexchange rate we used its
moving four-quarter standard deviation.35 Notethat beIore 1968 the van-
4.8 (2) ance of the real exchange ratehad already diminished as a result of the
lower inflation rates registered. However, inthe fourth quarter of 1968 a
sharp reduction in the fluctuations of thisreal rate occurred, without a
notable reduction in the level of the inflation rate. Thus, it seemsjustifiable
6
to consider 1968 as the turning pointof the trend in export receipts.
64
Tables 18 and 19 show data that support the argumentpresented in the
6 2 first part of this analysis concerning theperformance of foreign trade. First
6 6 we look at the evolutionof the officialreal exchange rate and of the
69 effective rates for exports and imports (Table 18).
6 2 The empirical treatment adoptedis outlined below. The official cx-
7.1 change rate (column 1) was deflated by theinternal price index (Index 2 of
8.5 Con jun(ura Econômica). Up to 1970for exports and 1969 for imports, the
0.4 figures for effective exchange rates were takenfrom Bergsman's work; the
others are our estimates. As far as exports areconcerned, the methodology
used was identical, so that the series areperfectly comparable.36 On the
import side, there is a small difference betweenBergsman's figures and our
estimates. This is so because it wasimpossible to include in the estiniates
for nominal protection the net effect of theso-called "Regimes Especiais de
ize of for- importacão" (special import systems),particularly "Precos de Referénicia"
ercent ofand "Contingênciamento."37This omission, however, turned out to be
ultiplying quantitatively unimportant, for it was possible to estimatenominal tariffs
ed when with and without "Regimes Especiais delmportacio" for 1971, and the
tail.33 To resulting effective exchange rates differed byonly 5 percent. Since the
olume number of products included under that systemdoes not seem to have
ed during increased substantially (at least not until 1973), webelieve our estimates
a muchcan be utilized withoutincurring large mistakes. It shouldbe recalled,
however, that the primary concern iswith evolution of the series rather
me when than its absolute values. One must also pointout that it was not possible to
de means estimate the effective 1974 exchange ratefor exports and the 1973 rate for
eased the imports.
Returning to Table 18, one can seethat the minidevaluation systemdid
in more not result in a faster devaluationof the cruzeiro; on the contrary, between
e present 1968 and 1973 the real exchange rateappreciated at an annual coni-
ation, it is pounded rate of 5.4 percent. On the otherhand, the export promotion
n policy,
system smoothed this tendencywithout avoiding appreciation. As a matter
anism of
of fact, the effective exchange rate for exportsappreciated over the same
lue of the
period at an annual coriipounded rateof 3.2 percent. The exchange ratefor
ns was to






































































































































































































3TABLE 18Official Real Exchange Rate and Effective
Exchange Rates for Imports and Exports
1960 2.8554 2.4096 4.7289 .96
1961 2.9923 2.6923 6.4176 1.38
1962 2.8094 2.6812 7.1812 1.68
1963 2.3842 2.2851 6.5331 1.86
1964 2.7572 2.6247 6.2104 1.37
1965 2.6160 2.5920 5.2268 1.02
1966 2.2229 2.2066 3.6299 .65
1967 2.0798 2.0445 2.9047 .42
1968 2.1344 2.1195 2.8742 .36
D 1969 2.1204 2.2135 3.0729 .39
1970 1.9952 2.0913 3.1909 .53
1971 1.9086 2.1428 3.0524 .42
1972 1.8314 2.0090 2.7559 .37
1973 1.6423 1.8072
1974 1.4183(4) 2.5751
SOURCE:Central Bank, Con jurrlura Econórri,ca.
Deflalor: Index 2 from Conjuntura EconO,nrca, FGV; 1965-1967 = 100.
Effective
Official Effective Effective Rate, M
Exchange Rate for Rate for Effective
Ratea Exports Imports Rate, K
(1) (2) (3) (4)
not only to the appreciation in theexchange rate but to some tariff
reductions as well.38
Table 19 shows the evolution of the terms of trade andof the price index
of exports and imports in U.S. dollars. In can be seenthat there was a
considerable gain in the terms of trade between 1968and 1973.The real
remuneration of exports increased over time at anannual rate of 8.1
percent. By the same token, the cost of importsincreased at an annual rate
of 1.7 percent between 1968 and 1972, due tothe upward tendency of
dollar prices of imports.
In short, it is possible to explain the movementof export receipts via the
joint effect of the minidevaluations, the exportpromotion system, and the
gains in the terms of trade, whichcombined to raise export revenues
despite the persistent appreciation in thereal exchange rate. The latter
development, discussed below, was consistentwith the increase in the
inflow of foreign capital.
It was already pointed out that the balanceof payments surpluses and
the resulting accumulation of reserves werethe result of a strong net inflow
of foreign capital from 1968 on. The capitalinflow permitted an increase in
the trade gap, and thus in the total savings rate aswell as in the capacity to
grow in the short and medium term.
A more detailed analysis shows that netcapital inflow was due mainly toTABLE 19Terms of Trade andExport and ImportPrices (1965-1967 100)
SOURCE:Central Bank, &iUtmOnuary 1975
a sharp increaseinforeign loans,especially thosecontractedinthe Euronion0nlarkets4u This inflowwas caused, on the supplyside, by the well-kno1 expansion inthe Eurodollarmarkets, and on the demandside, by two aspectsof the indexing policy.It was stressed beforethat inula tionary correctionwas practiced widely,particularly with relationto credit instrunients. consequently,interest rates became genera ly Positive,rang- ing from 4 to 10percent, dependingupon the source of credit.With the opening of theeconomy local eritreprenerirshad two choices:either to borrow in the domesticmarket, paying interestand inflationarycorrection, or in the Euroriioney market,
paying interest plusa risk Premium plus exchange rate devaluationsOf course,if external borrowingisat any given time cheaper thana domestic source the fornierwill be chosen (provided thereare no restrictions fromthe supply sideat prevailing interest rates). In fact,given the actual devaluationrate, external borrowing was found to be the cheapestalternative


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Itis not surprising that from 1969 on there was a net inflow of short-term
capital and an accumulation of reserves. Also, the minidevaluation policy,
by reducing the exchange rate risk substantially, increased the attractive-
ness of external financing.
On the other hand, and without supply restrictions, a persistent apprecia-
tion of the cruzeiro would bring such an inflow of capital that no
reasonable limits to external debt and monetary expansion could be
maintained. This is what happened in 1973, when the government was
forced to raise the cost of borrowing through the imposition of controls
(such as keeping part of the loan deposited with the monetary authorities,
maturities for new loans of more than five years, etc.).
In short, we found the foreign economic policy to follow a consistent,
although not necessarily the most economical, path. As long as the terms of
trade did not turn against the country, export income could rise despite the
appreciation of the exchange rate.This,inturn, induced an interest
differential which increased the net inflow of foreign resources, making it
possible to finance a wide trade gap and reinforce the national savings rate.
Itis believed, however, that given the conditions prevailing in 1974 (a
strong deterioration in the terms of trade and a higher growth rate of
income at home than abroad), this policy was no longer followed consis-
tently, mainly because export income needed to be reduced.
Finally,it must be said that the system described above has involved
some costs. It is accepted in the literature that devaluation is superior to an
export pro ution system that discriminates among various sectors.42 On
the other h id, administration of the external debt becomes more complex
in a systeri such as the one described. Altogether, however,it seems
reasonab'to conclude that the opening of the economy was indeed a key
factor i.tBrazil's economic boom between 1968 and 1973.
NOTES
1Although the expressionmonetary correction" has been generally used, we fee! that it
would fit in more with the concept involved here to use the expression 'inflationary
correction.'
Previous work by Delfim Netto et al. ("Alguns Aspectos da lnflacão Brasileira,"ANPES,
1965) shosvs that the subsidies to cover deficits of the nationalrailroad system and the
states shipping companies alone reached 60 percent of the Treasury'scash deficit in the
ate fifties and early sixties.
See, in this corineclion,1.Bergsrnan ('Brazil: Industrialization and Trade Policies,"
Oxford University Press for OECD, 1971).
This point is carefully made in M. H. Sinionsen, I. M. Chacel,and Wald ("Correção
Monetária," Rio de janeiro, APEC 1972).
See, for instance, j. Guenther ("Monetary Correction in Brazil," (paperpresented at
Seminar on Indexation, São Paulo, 1974)).







54 A. C. PastureR.[3. Almonacjd and
.R. M. Oi l3arros
do Choque?" Rio do,Ianipro, APEC1 9721 states that after the'ntrociujonifthe inflationary correction inflationitself would be almostindependent of therate o monetary expression, the feedbackmechanisms (inflationary correction)beings main deterniioiit in recentyears. A. Fishlow accepts thisidea ('MonetaryCorrection Inflation without Tears?'paper presented at St'niinar on IndexationSari Paulot974j and itisutilized in an argumentagainst the mechanisni of inflationarycorrection In another work A. C. Pastureand R. D Atmonacirl ("Graclualismo
OU Tratarnento de Chuque," Pescjuisae I'Ianejanrentrs Iconáqij( o, December1975) show that thr'Cxpecte rate of inflation tends lobe the dominantfactor in the short run, hut thatthe money supply is more important in the long run. Ifindexingatlows a faster feedback mechanismin the sense of increasing theawareness of the cost of holdingmoney, it can be a destabilizing factor See, for instance, S. A. Morley(tndexacão e Combate a tnflacáo"fstudo Ecnndrnjccic March 1976).
The implications of thisargument are analyzed in greaterdetail by Fendt (Seep. 93 below).
This point is elaborated inPastore and Alniiinacicl(l975i
Here we are including neithera discussion of the wage problem,partially analyzed by R. Macedo (Estudos Econr3rn,cosvol. 6, no.1,1976), nor the problem ofstability. See Simonsen, Chacel, and\Vald (1972), Guenther((974), and Fishlow (1973) The revenues of tIre federalgovernment as a proportion of GNPremained at a very loss lecel. See the analysisof Delfin-i Net(o or ,il.(965).
This is an application of the"principle of effective marketclassification" as defined by Mundefl. Clearly the allocationof fiscal policy toincrease government savings ,ind of monetary policy to stabilize theprice level is valid in a closedeconomy. Due to thtack of substantial capitalniovenierits in Brazil at that period andto the nature of interna- tional trade restrictions, thisis a valid ox-postoroposition in the case underconsid- eration.
The empirical analysesmade by A. Harberger ("TheDynamics of Inflation in Chile,"in C. Christ, ed., A1easu,e,iie,itsin £conomics, Stanford,19631 for Chile, A. C. Diz ("Money and Pricesin Argentina, 1935-1962," inD. Meiselnianed., Varietjec in Monetary Experience.1970) for Argentina, Pastore("Notes on the Recent Monetary Policy in Brazil," .4nnjsof Economic and SocialMeasurement, 4:4, 1975) forBrazil, and more recently byR. Vogelmer,can Economic Review March1974) for a series of Latin American countries showthat the rate of inflationtakes a fairly long period oftime (one year or more) to adjustto changes in the moneysupply. See P. Cagan ("The Monetary
Dynaniucs of Hyperinflation" inM. Friedman, ed., Studies in the Quantity Theoryof Money, Chicago, 1956)for the case of sevenhyperinftatiç I. Deaver ("The ChileanInflation and the Demand forMoney," in D. Meiselman,op do for Chile, Di(1970) for Argentina, andPastore (1975) for Brazil We are obviouslyconcentr,lting only on theresources derived from the inflationtax, leaving aside the discussionrelated to the welfarecosts of inflation finance See Pastore and Alninnacjd(t971.













































Brazil jail lnclexat:un 55
This implies that ir a distributed lag model in which the price eve! is expressed as a
function of the present and past values of M we irust have negative weights after a




As the inconie elasticity Of the demand 101 money is positive, and some of the revenues
depend on y, the full equi I ibriuni inflation revenue will be underestima ted if income is
growing. M. Fniednian ("Government Revenue from Inflation," Journal of Political
Economy, 19721 called attentiono this point.
We are ignoring the social costs involved in controlling thepayment of interests on
deposits. This induces banks to pay implicit interest in the form of services,which is the
utilization of real resources. This point is pursued in Fendt in this volume.
27A good description of the main tax reform inBrazilis given in Simonsen's paper
at this seminar.
A better explanation of the institutional reforms inBrazil is given in Pastore 11973).
See Pasture (Pesquisa e Planejamento Ewnômico,December 1973).
The data after 1970 are fronir tile revised National Accountspublished by tire Vargas
Foundation.
11.Clearly, the rise in the inflation rate in the rest of theworld ought 10 increase the
nominal interest rate there and wash out this clifterence. Ithappened that this rate did
not adjust fully to inflation, thus subsidizing Brazil. Onthe other hand, the way ur which
exchange rate expectations are formed in Brazil is also acontroversial issue. Between
1968 arid 1973 the current accounts(lelicit in the balance of payments remained more
or less under control (theCentral Bank has calculated that a trade gap of I billion dollars
a year would reduce the service-debtratio over timel. With a growing trade gap (likethe
one in 1974, which reached 5billion dollars), people can expect a sharper devaluation,
reducing their incentive to borrow abroad in order to avoid amassive capital loss.
We also must consider the reductionofrisk,aiready niotd, derived from the
minidevaluation polcy-
GNP is evaluated on tile basis of internal prices.
We also have to consider the technologicalniprovemnent due to the inIlow of capital
goods and the addItional demand for lagged sectors,such as textiles, shoes, and
agricultural products.
We estimated moving standard deviationsfor each set of four quarters from 1960 on.
The export incentives here considered are essentially thoseincluded in tire federal )IPI)
and state (1CM) value added tax.
The "preco de reIethncia" is an antidumping device, whereihe tariff is paid over a price
imposed by the Tariff Council, independent ot the actua import CIF price.Tire "regime
de contingênciarnerito" obliges local enterprises to buy somequantity of a locally
produced product in order to be able to import the very sameproduct at a preferential
tariff.
In 1974 tariffs rose again. The average nominaltariff was 59.9c7r in 1971, 50.Sqc in 1972,
and 81.6'7rin 1974.
Although data from 1974 are unknown, the terms ol tradeturned against the country
mainly clue to the rise in petroleum prices.
For more details, see Conjuntor,t EconOmica, lanuary1 975.
41 .Those are the indexes utilized to corct the valueo1 most bonus.
42.The Brazilian export promotion sv,iem is, to alarge extent, the mirror image of tire
import substitution system. See, for example,Mendonca de Barros etal. 11973) and
Savasini et al. 11974).